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Abstract—Common authentication methods based on pass-
words, tokens, or fingerprints perform one-time authentication
and rely on users to log out from the computer terminal when
they leave. Users often do not log out, however, which is a
security risk. The most common solution, inactivity timeouts,
inevitably fail security (too long a timeout) or usability (too
short a timeout) goals. One solution is to authenticate users con-
tinuously while they are using the terminal and automatically
log them out when they leave. Several solutions are based on
user proximity, but these are not sufficient: they only confirm
whether the user is nearby but not whether the user is actually
using the terminal. Proposed solutions based on behavioral
biometric authentication (e.g., keystroke dynamics) may not
be reliable, as a recent study suggests.
To address this problem we propose Zero-Effort Bilateral
Recurring Authentication (ZEBRA). In ZEBRA, a user wears a
bracelet (with a built-in accelerometer, gyroscope, and radio) on
her dominant wrist. When the user interacts with a computer
terminal, the bracelet records the wrist movement, processes
it, and sends it to the terminal. The terminal compares the
wrist movement with the inputs it receives from the user (via
keyboard and mouse), and confirms the continued presence
of the user only if they correlate. Because the bracelet is
on the same hand that provides inputs to the terminal, the
accelerometer and gyroscope data and input events received
by the terminal should correlate because their source is the
same – the user’s hand movement. In our experiments ZEBRA
performed continuous authentication with 85% accuracy in
verifying the correct user and identified all adversaries within
11 s. For a different threshold that trades security for usability,
ZEBRA correctly verified 90% of users and identified all
adversaries within 50 s.
I. INTRODUCTION
Desktop computers (also called computer terminals or
simply terminals) are still being used in large numbers at
workplaces and at homes, often by multiple users. To prevent
unauthorized access users authenticate themselves before
using the terminal (e.g., by logging in with username and
password) and deauthenticate (i.e., log out) after their use.
This important deauthentication step, however, is overlooked
by most authentication schemes. Common schemes such as
password-based or fingerprint-based authentication provide
one-time authentication and rely on the users to log out.
Unfortunately, users often do not log out, they either forget
to log out or intentionally do not log out to avoid logging
in again. Although deauthentication is important for many
different devices, our focus in this work is to address the
deauthentication problem on computer terminals; future
extensions will support laptops, tablets, and phones.
The consequence of not logging out from a terminal can
be severe: an adversary with access to your terminal can
snoop through your private information, modify or delete
your data, or steal your credentials to take actions on your
behalf. Even in a non-adversarial setting, other authorized
users could accidentally misuse your account if you forget to
log out. For instance, Koppel et al. [1] report that physicians
frequently enter data into the wrong patient’s record because
they thought the open record belonged to the patient they
were treating; in fact, while they were away from the terminal
another physician used that terminal to update a different
patient’s record and forgot to log out. Sometimes clinicians
leave terminals intentionally logged in, as a professional
courtesy, so that the next user does not have to log in.
This deauthentication problem is a major concern in a busy
multi-user environment where users have to authenticate and
deauthenticate often, e.g., when users’ use of terminals is
interlaced or when they have to use a terminal multiple
times but for short durations. For example, in a clinical
inpatient setting where physicians, nurses, residents, and
medical students come and go, check on patients, and use any
available terminal to view and update patient medical records;
or in a busy restaurant or retail shop where employees share
kiosks to place orders and manage bills.
Even in workspaces where users have their own personal
terminals, deauthentication is an important problem. Users
either forget to log out or intentionally do not log out as a
workaround to avoid logging in later; they find password-
based authentication (the most common authentication
method) tedious and time consuming. Thus, users often log
in once when they arrive at work and log out when they leave,
but they do not log out during their shift when they step
away from the terminal, leaving their terminal vulnerable to
snooping and attacks by a co-worker or a passerby.
The most common solution to the deauthentication problem
is ‘timeouts’, i.e., to execute automatic logout after inactivity
for a timeout period. The problem with this approach is
that a single timeout period does not work for everyone and
often timeout periods are blind to context [2], [3]. Another
approach is to use a proximity sensor that detects a users’
departure and log them out, but these sensors are unreliable
in crowded environments [4].
One way to automate the deauthentication process is to
continuously authenticate the current user and, when the user
changes, deauthenticate the previous user and ask the new
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user to authenticate herself. There are two goals that make
this method challenging. First, continuous authentication
should be passive (i.e., without requiring explicit action by
the user) and unobtrusive so that it is not a burden on the
user. Second, the system should quickly identify that the
user has departed or changed without relying on users to
log themselves out, because users often forget to log out.
Computer use that is frequent, irregular, and short-lived – as
is the case in hospitals – makes continuous authentication
particularly challenging.
Our approach is to continuously authenticate a user based
on her interactions with a terminal by monitoring her hand
movements and comparing them with her inputs to the
terminal using input devices (i.e, the keyboard and mouse).
As with behavioral biometrics based on keystroke and mouse
dynamics, our approach is based on the user’s interactions –
but there is an important distinction. Behavioral biometrics
rely on how the user does a particular interaction (e.g.,
how the user types or how the user moves a mouse) and
hence require user-specific training and typically require
long periods of observation to authenticate the user. Our
approach relies on what interactions the user does when
using a terminal and hence does not require user-specific
training or long periods of observation to authenticate the user.
We confirm the user’s continued presence by observing what
the user is doing from two different sources and comparing
those observations; we call this bilateral authentication. This
approach complements any method that may be used for
initial authentication, such as a password, a token, or a
fingerprint biometric.
Zero-Effort Bilateral Recurring Authentication, or ZEBRA,
monitors a user’s hand movements via a bracelet worn on
their wrist that they use to control the mouse. This bracelet
is registered to the user, like any authentication token, so its
presence should imply the presence of the associated user.
ZEBRA goes beyond mere proximity, however. After logging
in (using additional credentials) the user interacts with the
terminal and the bracelet records the user’s hand movements
using built-in accelerometer and gyroscope sensors and
transmits their data to the terminal over a short-range radio
(e.g., Bluetooth). The terminal then compares the user’s hand
movements with the inputs it observes and confirms the
presence of the user if they correlate. For example, when
the user clicks the mouse and then starts typing (with both
hands) his hand used to control the mouse (bracelet hand)
moves from the mouse to the keyboard; when the user scrolls
using the mouse scroll-wheel his hand is relatively stationary.
It is these kinds of hand motions that the terminal expects for
inputs that it receives from the user. The core idea of ZEBRA
is that if the bracelet is on the same hand that provides inputs
to the terminal then the accelerometer and gyroscope data
(from the bracelet) and the terminal input events should
correlate because their source is the same – the user’s mouse
hand movement. Conversely, if these movements no longer
correlate, the terminal infers that a different person is now
using the terminal and can take action (e.g., to lock the screen,
log out the former user, or require initial authentication for
the new user).
We make three main contributions. First, we introduce a
new type of authentication, bilateral authentication, which
falls into a new category of authentication of ‘what the user
does when interacting’ with a terminal. It is worth mentioning
again that this is distinct from behavioral biometrics that fall
into the category ‘how the user interacts’. Second, we propose
ZEBRA, a novel mechanism to continuously authenticate the
current user passively and unobtrusively, and to automatically
deauthenticate the user. We further describe how ZEBRA
can be used to improve the initial authentication process
(e.g., username and password). Third, we evaluate ZEBRA’s
performance with a user study and demonstrate strong results.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Passwords are one of the oldest and the most common
authentication schemes. Passwords are convenient because
users do not have to carry anything, they are intuitive, and
are efficient to use. However, the plight of passwords is well
documented [5], [6]. Users find it hard to remember strong
passwords, and they use workarounds such as choosing weak
passwords, sharing them, reusing them, writing them down,
or intentionally leaving their terminals unlocked so that they
do not have to enter the password again [4], [7]–[12]. One
problem with password-based authentication schemes is that
there is no reliable and convenient way to deauthenticate
users, so if a user leaves a terminal unlocked any passerby
can access it. Organizations have tried timeouts for auto
deauthentication, but efforts have failed because they are not
reliable [2].
To address the limitation of a timeout approach to deau-
thenticate, some have proposed using proximity sensors that
detect close proximity of a human, and when the user walks
away, they detect the user’s departure and log out the user if
necessary. Proximity-based deauthentication, like timeouts, is
blind to context, and one proximity setting may not work for
all users. Moreover, as Sinclair et al. [4] report, these sensors
were not reliable when they were tested in a hospital – they
will trigger when someone walks past in the hallway and
would sometimes log a user out when she was still using the
terminal. Their deauthentication solution frustrated the users,
who developed a work-around by covering the proximity
sensor with an empty cup.
A proximity-based authentication scheme using a wearable
token (e.g., ZIA [13]) also provides passive continuous
authentication, but such schemes are not reliable in dense
workspaces such as hospitals, where multiple authorized
users may be near the terminal at the same time. Although
proximity-based authentication schemes are well suited for
single-user machine scenarios, their attack window lasts until
the user walks out of the proximity range, which may be many
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minutes. When there is a group of clinicians near a device,
whom should the device authenticate? Sinclair et al. [4]
note these shortcomings of proximity-based authentication
mechanisms from their observations of clinicians’ terminal
use and their discussions with the clinicians.
Biometrics are convenient because users do not have to
remember their credentials – they are always with them.
However, biometrics can be stolen by physical observation
or internal observation (from within the device) and they
are hard to recover from theft or loss, because it may not
be possible to change the biometric. Some biometrics such
as fingerprint or iris require user input, which makes them
unsuitable for continuous user authentication. Biometrics
based on voice or face may be suitable for continuous
authentication provided they can be captured easily and
correctly without interrupting the user, which is not always
possible when the user is not speaking or in front of her
camera. Behavioral biometrics based on keystroke dynamics
or mouse dynamics provide unobtrusive passive continuous
authentication. However, they require a user-enrollment step
and as a user’s behavior changes they need to be re-enrolled,
which may increase the maintenance cost of this scheme.
Moreover, keystroke-based biometric is not resilient to theft
or internal observation, as Meng et al. [14] show that an
attacker with some training can successfully mimic a user’s
typing behavior. Rasmussen et al. [15] propose a pulse-
based biometric for continuous authentication where a metal
keyboard sends small electric current through the user’s body
and verifies the user based on the user’s body’s resistance
to the current. Such an approach has significant deployment
cost, because it requires modifying every input device. This
scheme requires users’ hands to be in-touch with the keyboard
at the same time for the pulse to pass through the body, and
this restricts how the user may use a keyboard.
Table I shows a comparative evaluation of ZEBRA with
the authentication schemes described above, using the
usability-deployability-security (UDS) framework [16]. UDS
framework is actually for evaluating web authentication
schemes, but some of its evaluation properties are applicable
to authentication schemes for devices; we use some of
those properties and 3 additional properties to compare
continuous authentication schemes: Verifying-Actual-User,
the scheme should verify who is actually using a terminal;
No-Constraint-on-Using-the-Device, the scheme should work
irrespective of how the user uses the device; and Automatic-
Deauthentication, the scheme should automatically deauthen-
ticate users. Due to lack of space we do not provide a detailed
comparative evaluation here; we refer readers to our technical
report for details [17].
The closest work is perhaps ‘shake well before use’ [18],
in which a user shakes two devices to generate a shared
encryption key between them. Also similar is the product
Bump [19], wherein users bump their phones to exchange
contacts. In these works, the same action (shaking or

















































































































= offers the benefit; = almost offers the benefit; no circle= does not
offer the benefit. = better than ZEBRA; = worse than ZEBRA; no
pattern= equivalent to ZEBRA.
1Properties from the UDS framework. 2Additional properties, not in UDS.
bumping) is observed by two different devices and compared
to generate an encryption key or match two devices. In
both these cases, the user must take explicit action, so these
methods are not passive or unobtrusive. Furthermore, the
signals being observed and compared are of the same type –
accelerometer signals. In our work, we have two different
types of signals to correlate – one is from the sensors in the
bracelet and the other is a set of input events on a terminal.
Consider the following two use cases that motivate the
need for ZEBRA.
Sally is a member of clinical staff in a hospital. She walks
to a computer terminal and logs in to update her patient’s
record. She needs some more information from her colleague
to update the record. She steps away to talk to that colleague,
leaving the terminal open because she is planning to come
back and update that record. Sally does not return before
the timeout period expires, so the terminal automatically
logs Sally out. In the meantime another clinician, Tina, logs
into the same terminal and updates a record and leaves,
again forgetting to log out. Soon Sally returns and finds that
terminal open. She assumes that it is still her account and
her patient’s record, since she was using it earlier. Sally does
not check whether it is indeed her account and her patient,
nor does the system, and she accidentally updates the wrong
patient’s record under Tina’s name. Incidents like these are
not uncommon in hospitals [1], [3].
Claire, a chemical engineer, is authorized to alter the
operation of a drug manufacturing plant using a terminal
linked to the plants SCADA system. After logging in she
gets an emergency call from her sister and walks around a
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nearby corner to hear her sister better, knowing the terminal
automatically logs out in 15 minutes. Jake, a biomedical
engineer competing with Claire for a promotion, happens by
and notices the open terminal is logged into Claire’s account.
He makes a subtle change in the plants operation that reduces
efficiency and gets logged as Claire’s doing, and then quickly
walks away. Claire, the better and more honest engineer is
passed over for promotion in favor of devious Jake because
of her “mistake”. The US Code of Federal Regulations, Title
21, Part 11 requires many FDA-regulated industries such as
drug makers, medical device manufacturers, biotechnology
companies, biologics developers and others to implement
measures to control, monitor and report access to critical
terminal control systems [20], [21]. Terminal timeouts are
an important part of these protections but may be inadequate
to prevent tampering.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
ZEBRA is designed to prevent intentional and accidental
misuse of a user’s account on a terminal. ZEBRA is not
a method for initial authentication; rather, it compliments
any existing initial authentication schemes by providing
continuous authentication and automatic deauthentication.
When a user logs in (e.g., by providing username and
password), ZEBRA continuously authenticates the current
user (i.e., verifies whether the current user is the same user
who logged in), and when a different user starts using the
same terminal while the current user is logged in, ZEBRA
deauthenticates the current user, thereby preventing account
misuse. In this section, we state the assumptions that we
make for ZEBRA, its desired properties, and its adversary
model.
Assumptions. We make the following assumptions.
1) We assume that each user wears a bracelet on the
hand she uses to control the mouse interface. The
bracelet has built-in accelerometer and gyroscope
sensors and a wireless radio (e.g., Bluetooth) that it
uses to communicate with the terminal. Today, many
wrist-worn fitness devices meet these assumptions,
demonstrating that such a device is feasible and can
have long battery life.
2) Each bracelet is associated with a single user, and users
do not share bracelets. This association can be imple-
mented using a variety of approaches. For instance,
one can use a biometric bracelet [22], or a user may
be required to enter a PIN when she puts the bracelet
on to activate it, and the bracelet would deactivate
when it is removed from the wrist or after a period of
time (e.g., 24 hours). This assumption is similar to the
photo ID-cards used by many organizations. In other
instances there might be a biometrically-authenticated
station where employees check out bracelets at the
start of a shift.
3) The bracelet and the terminal are already paired; they
share encryption keys that they can use to secure
their communication. Pairing is a one-time task and
any suitable pairing method may be used [23]. In an
enterprise setting, we assume administrative tools pair
all bracelets with all terminals in a distributed fashion.
4) We assume that all communication between the bracelet
and terminal is secured by other means (e.g., Bluetooth
Low Energy or ANT+ protocols). The terminal does
not communicate wirelessly to untrusted/unknown
bracelets.
5) There exists an initial authentication scheme (e.g.,
username-password) that users use to log in to termi-
nals. Once they log in, ZEBRA continuously verifies
that the current user is the same user who logged in.
Desired properties. We desire ZEBRA to be
1) Continuous: It should continuously authenticate the
current user as long as the user is logged in.
2) Passive: It should not require any explicit user inter-
vention and should not interrupt the user.
3) Unobtrusive: It should be completely unobtrusive and
should not invade the user’s privacy; the user should
be comfortable using the system.
4) Quick: It should be quick to identify when a user other
than the logged-in user starts using the terminal so that
it can deauthenticate the logged-in user to prevent any
access misuse.
5) Accurate: It should not incorrectly deauthenticate a
user nor falsely authenticate a user.
6) User-agnostic: It should not require any user-specific
training.
Adversary model. We are primarily concerned with the
threat of unauthorized access when the user forgets to log
out when stepping away from the terminal, even if the user
remains in the terminal’s proximity doing other tasks (e.g.,
walking, writing, talking to someone, or working on another
nearby terminal). If the user steps out of the radio’s proximity
range of the terminal one can use proximity-based solutions.
We consider two types of adversaries. First, an innocent
authorized user who wants to use a terminal for her own
task: she finds an open terminal and uses it, either because
she assumes the logged-in account on the terminal is hers
or because she does not want to do the login step. Second,
a malicious individual wants to use an open (logged-in)
terminal while the already logged-in user is nearby, perhaps
because the logged-in user has privileges desired by the
adversary, or the adversary wants to take action in the name
of the logged-in victim. This adversary may try to observe
and mimic the logged-in user’s hand movements to fool the
terminal into falsely authenticating himself as that user.
IV. APPROACH
In this section we introduce bilateral authentication, com-




Traditional user-authentication schemes authenticate a user
by comparing an attribute that the user produces with a
previously stored attribute. For instance, password-based
authentication schemes compare the hash of the user-entered
password with the stored password hash, voice-based authen-
tication schemes compare features of the user’s voice against
stored features of authorized users’ voices, and a keystroke-
based biometric scheme compares keystroke dynamics of the
user with the user’s stored keystroke dynamics.
In our case, bilateral authentication, the user is authenti-
cated by comparing two observations of the same attribute
of the user, measured separately in real-time by two sources
(hence the term bilateral). A related example of a bilateral
authentication method is the ‘same-body authentication’
solution by Cornelius et al. [24]. They measure a user’s
motion using multiple accelerometer sensors placed at
different positions on the body and compare these sensors’
signals (which measure the same attribute, the user’s motion)
to determine whether all the sensors are on the same body.
A general bilateral user-authentication method can be
described as a user-authentication method where an attribute
about the user, a, is observed and measured by two indepen-
dent parties P and Q, where these measured signals could
be the same (as in the above example) or different (as in
ZEBRA) but the user is authenticated only if the two signals
correlate. The attribute a could be physiological (e.g., heart
rate, body temperature), behavioral (e.g., walking, user’s
interaction with device), or environmental (e.g., being in the
same room, radio signal).
There are several benefits of bilateral authentication,
some of which overlap with desired properties identified
by previous research [16]. These include:
1) No need to store sensitive information in the authenti-
cating device. Although sensitive information can be
stored securely, in practice it is not stored securely,
and when the system is compromised users’ sensitive
information is leaked [25]. By eliminating the need to
store any sensitive information we eliminate this risk.
2) No mental burden on users. Users have to remember
their password if they use a password-based authen-
tication scheme; previous work has shown that users
are not good at remembering passwords and they use
work-arounds to avoid using passwords [4], [8]. In
bilateral authentication there is no secret for users to
remember.
3) No hassle for users over time. Users’ habits and
behaviors change over time, either naturally or due
to an injury or illness. Behavior-based authentication
schemes are susceptible to these changes, and they need
to be re-trained for the user whose behavior changed
over time. Bilateral authentication does not rely on any
user-specific behavior, only on the fact that the user is
doing specific interactions with the terminal.
4) No hardware modifications to the terminal, assuming
it has short-range radio such as Bluetooth.
Bilateral authentication, however, cannot always be used
because it is not always possible to monitor the users’
interaction externally. Not all interactions between the user
and desktop involve the dominant hand; notably, periods of
screen reading involve no motion at all. We expect that, much
as with common screen-saver software, users will need to
periodically jiggle the mouse while reading extensively.
B. ZEBRA
ZEBRA provides continuous authentication, that is, it
continuously verifies the identity of the logged-in user.
Although continuous authentication has many uses, it is a
necessary foundation for a smart deauthentication mechanism.
Such a mechanism can automatically take protective action
(such as locking the screen) when another user starts using
a terminal that a previous user had logged in to.
ZEBRA works as follows: Jane, a ZEBRA user, logs in to
the terminal, the terminal connects wirelessly to her bracelet
(because she had paired them earlier, the terminal can look
up her bracelet’s network address, given her username, and
seek that bracelet on the short-range radio connection). The
presence of the bracelet may optionally be required by the
login process, serving as a second-factor token, strengthening
the initial authentication step. We are concerned here with
what happens after login, continuously verifying that Jane
remains the active user of the terminal. As Jane uses the
terminal, the bracelet captures the sensor data (accelerometer
and gyroscope) from Jane’s dominant wrist movement and
sends it to the terminal. From the acceleration data the
terminal receives, it generates, using a classifier, a sequence
of ‘interactions’ (mouse scrolling or typing) that Jane appears
to be doing. The terminal also generates the actual sequence
of interactions, based on the inputs it receives from keyboard
and mouse. By comparing these two sequences of interactions,
the terminal verifies whether the user using the terminal is
Jane, i.e., the one wearing the bracelet.
When Jane steps away from the terminal and another user
starts using the terminal, the two sequences of interactions
will not match because the interaction sequence that Jane’s
bracelet generates when she is away from her terminal will
be different from the interaction sequence of the other user
on the terminal. Since the two interaction sequences will not
match, the terminal will deauthenticate Jane and take action
to prevent another user from misusing her account.
The idea of ZEBRA stems from two observations: i) people
interact with most input devices with their hands, and ii) a
user’s hand movements when the user interacts with an input
device can be correlated to the inputs the device receives. For
example, when the user is scrolling or clicking, her fingers
are moving but her wrist is relatively stationary; when the
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user clicks the mouse and then starts typing on the keyboard
(typically with both hands), her hand will move from the
mouse to keyboard. Thus, the hypothesis driving ZEBRA is
that if we can capture the user’s hand movement and compare
it with the inputs the terminal receives, we can determine
whether the user is using the terminal.
Figure 1 shows a user’s wrist acceleration when she was
interacting with the terminal. The x-axis represents the time
(in seconds) from the start of the experiment and the y-axis
represents the magnitude of the acceleration, as measured by
the bracelet on the wrist. We marked, with shaded regions,
three types of user interactions in the figure: scrolling, typing,
and MKKM, where MKKM stands for ‘Mouse to Keyboard
or Keyboard to Mouse’ interaction representing the action
of switching between keyboard and mouse. As shown in
the figure, the user scrolled the mouse at 65.5 s, from 66.3 s
to 74.4 s, and then briefly at 75.1 s. The graph shows that
her wrist was relatively still during scrolling, as one would
expect. When she moved her hand from mouse to keyboard
(around 77 s) to type, we see a sudden spike in acceleration
caused as she lifted her hand off the mouse and as she rested
her hands on the keyboard. As she typed (77.5 s to 83.4 s),
we see small changes in the acceleration, implying that her
wrist moves little during typing. After typing she switched
from keyboard to mouse (around 83.5 s), and we see another
sudden spike in the acceleration.
We can see the differences in the acceleration patterns
between interactions. For instance, broadly speaking, there
is more wrist movement during typing than scrolling, but
less than when she switches between keyboard and mouse.
This example supports our hypothesis that we can generate
a sequence of interactions from a user’s wrist movement.
The acceleration data that is not marked in the graph
represents the user’s other interactions with the terminal
such as mouse-dragging, clicking, or hand movements not
involving interaction with the terminal; we highlighted only
three types of interactions on the graph for readability.
C. Dealing with adversaries
ZEBRA deals with the two adversaries described in
Section III as follows:
In the case of the innocent authorized user who wants
to use an already open terminal for her own task, if Sally
attempts to use the terminal that Tina left open, the terminal
will try to verify whether the current user (Sally) is Tina.
If the terminal does not receive data from Tina’s bracelet,
e.g., because Tina is not near the terminal, ZEBRA will log
Tina out and will attempt to log Sally in. If Tina is near the
terminal but not using the terminal, e.g., she may be talking
to a nurse, then ZEBRA will attempt to correlate Tina’s
bracelet movements with Sally’s inputs on the terminal. The
classification will fail with high probability, and ZEBRA will
log Tina out and attempt to log Sally in. Thus, ZEBRA will
prevent an innocent authorized user from performing a task,
e.g., updating a patient’s record, with another authorized
user’s credentials.
ZEBRA deals with the case of a malicious individual in
a similar fashion. In the second use-case, Claire leaves her
terminal unattended, and Jake manages to get access to her
terminal before the terminal times out and auto-locks. As
Jake tries to navigate the terminal using the keyboard and
mouse, the terminal will try to correlate Jake’s inputs with
Claire’s hand movements. Assuming that it is hard to control
a terminal at will by mimicking Claire’s hand movements
while she is around the corner talking on the phone, the
correlation will fail in a similar manner to the previous case
and, therefore, the terminal will lock, preventing Jake from
misusing Claire’s account. Our evaluation shows that our
assumption is reasonable in the case of humans trying to
mimic human hand movements. We touch on the resilience
of ZEBRA to automated attacks in Section VII-C.
V. METHOD
In this section, we describe the ZEBRA architecture and
our approach to correlate a terminal’s input with bracelet
acceleration data.
A. Architecture
Figure 2 shows the architecture of ZEBRA. As shown
in the figure, there are five main components in ZEBRA.
The interaction extractor extracts interactions from a user’s
keyboard and mouse inputs, and sends the sequence of
interactions to the authenticator and the time intervals of the
interactions to the segmenter. The segmenter segments the
accelerometer and gyroscope data into blocks based on the
time intervals it receives from the interaction extractor. The
feature extractor extracts features for each block of data that
it receives from the segmenter. The interaction classifier takes
these features and classifies them into one of our specified
interactions. The authenticator compares the actual sequence
of interactions that it receives from the interaction extractor
and the inferred sequence of interactions that it receives from
the interaction classifier, and it makes a decision whether the
two users – the current terminal user and the user wearing
the bracelet – are the same or different. If they are different
then we need to deauthenticate the bracelet user, who is
currently logged in to the terminal. Based on the system
policy or user preference, ZEBRA can either logout the user,
lock the screen, raise an alarm, or take some other action.
Below we discuss each component in detail.
B. Interaction extractor
As mentioned, this component extracts ‘interactions’ from
the input events stream generated by the OS when the user
provides inputs to the terminal via keyboard or mouse. We
use three main types of user interactions with a terminal:
MKKM, scrolling, and typing. There are other interactions,
such as moving the mouse, dragging the mouse, or clicking
710

































Figure 2: ZEBRA architecture.
the mouse, but we do not consider them because in our
evaluation they did not contribute to ZEBRA’s performance.
MKKM. This interaction captures the users’ dominant hand
(here, we mean the mouse hand) movement when she
switches from the mouse to the keyboard or from the
keyboard to the mouse; MKKM is short for ‘Mouse to
Keyboard or Keyboard to Mouse’. An MKKM interaction
consists of a mouse-related event followed by a keypress
event or vice-versa.
There is, however, a challenge in identifying whether the
keypress event followed by a mouse-related event was caused
by the dominant hand or the other hand, because the user
may press a key with her non-dominant hand while keeping
her dominant hand on the mouse. With one bracelet, we
cannot identify such events with certainty. We account for
such events by dividing the keys on the keyboard into three
zones, depending on which hand the user is likely to use to
press that key: left zone, middle (or ambiguous) zone, and
right zone, as shown in Figure 3. We introduced the ‘middle’
zone because not everyone types according to two-handed
typing guidelines, which divides the keyboard into two zones,
and we noticed some subjects used either hand to type the
keys in the middle zone. So, if the user is right handed (that
is, uses the mouse with her right hand) and presses a key in
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the right zone after a mouse event, we assume she moved
her dominant hand. Thus, we assume that users will stick
with our zone divisions, i.e., use their left hand for keys in
the left zone and their right hand for keys in the right zone.
Some users may break this assumption, but this heuristic
seemed to work well, because to identify MKKM we only
need the user to press any one key in the right (or left) zone
with their right (or left) hand, and we observed that all our
subjects did use two hands when typing.
Scrolling. This interaction captures users’ use of a scroll-
wheel built-in to the mouse. When a user is scrolling,
ScrollWheel events are continuously generated by the
OS, each event reporting the amount of scroll performed
by the user since the last scroll, so that the application can
update the UI accordingly. We define a scrolling interaction
as a sequence of uninterrupted ScrollWheel events.
However, sometimes the mouse is slightly moved because
the user’s hand is not still, and we observe some MouseMove
events in the ScrollWheel events stream. The idea behind
this interaction is to capture the durations during which
the user was using the mouse and her hand (wrist) was
relatively stationary, so we ignore small mouse movements.
We consider a mouse movement as small if the associated
MouseMove events in the ScrollWheel events stream
are few in number (e.g., 5 events) and the cumulative
mouse displacement indicated by these MouseMove events
is small (e.g., 5 pixels). These thresholds (minimum number
of MouseMove events and maximum mouse displacement)
are parameters in our experiments.
Thus, we define a scrolling interaction as a sequence of
ScrollWheel events with few intervening MouseMove
events such that the total mouse displacement is small (below
a certain threshold).
Typing. This interaction captures the users’ use of the
keyboard. When a user hits a key, she first presses the key
down, and then as she removes her finger she releases the
key up. Associated to these actions, two events are generated
by the OS for each keypress: KeyDown and KeyUp. Thus,
we define a typing interaction as a sequence of KeyDown
and KeyUp events.
If there is a continuous keypress events stream with mouse-
related events in between, we count those keypress events as
separate typing interactions, separated by the mouse-related
events. Unlike scrolling, where we ignored small numbers of
mouse-related events, during typing any mouse-related event
means that the user moved her hand from keyboard to mouse,
which is an MKKM interaction. Thus, for a keypress events
sequence with few mouse-related events in between, we
extract at least four interactions: typing, MKKM (to switch
to mouse), MKKM (to switch back to keyboard), typing, and
maybe scrolling between the two MKKM events if the user
scrolled the mouse-wheel.
Figure 3: Keyboard divided into left, middle, and right zones.
Extraction. When extracting interactions from input events,
we apply three constraints: idle threshold, minimum duration,
and maximum duration. Idle threshold is the maximum time
difference between two consecutive events in an interaction.
The rationale behind this constraint is to capture only the
interactions that involve the user’s continuous interaction
with the terminal and eliminate interactions during which the
user does tasks other than using the mouse and the keyboard.
During a pause, there is no input to the terminal; we do not
know what the user is doing, and thus cannot correlate with
the user’s wrist movement. If there is a pause greater than
the threshold, we split the interaction into two interactions
separated by the pause. For example, if in a series of keypress
events there is a 2min pause, then we split these keypress
events into two typing interactions, one before the pause
begins and one after the pause ends.
The other constraints refer to the minimum and maximum
duration of interactions. If an interaction lasts for less than the
minimum duration, we ignore it, and if an interaction exceeds
the maximum duration we split it into two consecutive
interactions. While splitting the interaction we do ensure
that the new interaction is longer than the minimum duration:
if the new split interaction has duration less than the minimum
duration, we do not split the interaction; thus, we can have
interactions that are almost as long as minimum duration +
maximum duration.
Based on these three constraints and the definitions of
the interactions described above, this component outputs
a sequence of interactions from given input events. This
sequence of interactions, IE, is of the form
(I0, t0, t1), (I1, t2, t3), . . .
where I0 is an interaction ID (corresponding to one of the
three described interactions) that starts at time t0 and ends
at t1, and similarly interaction I1 spans (t2, t3).
From the sequence IE, interaction ID sequence
(I0, I1, . . .) is sent to the authenticator. The interaction tim-
ings sequence ((t0, t1), (t2, t3), . . .) is sent to the segmenter.
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C. Segmenter
This component receives accelerometer and gyroscope data
from the user’s bracelet. The accelerometer data is of the
form
(ti, xi, yi, zi), (tj , xj , yj , zj), . . .
where (ti, xi, yi, zi) represents one acceleration data sample
taken at time ti and the instantaneous accelerations along x,
y, and z axes are xi, yi, zi, respectively. The gyroscope data
is of the similar form
(ti, ai, bi, ci), (tj , aj , bj , cj), . . .
where (ti, ai, bi, ci) represents one gyroscope data sample
taken at time ti and represents the instantaneous rotational
velocity along x, y, and z axes, ai, bi, ci, respectively.
As shown in Figure 2 the segmenter receives actual
interaction time intervals from the interaction extractor. The
segmenter breaks the acceleration data stream into blocks
corresponding to each time interval, using the time of each
data sample and the time of the intervals. For the time-
interval sequence, ((t0, t1), (t2, t3), . . .) this component will
place all the accelerometer and gyroscope data samples with
time t0 ≤ t ≤ t1 into the first block, all the data samples with
time t2 ≤ t ≤ t3 into the second block, and so on. These
data blocks are sent to the feature extractor. Acceleration and
gyroscope samples outside interaction intervals are discarded.
In most signal-processing algorithms, data is segmented
into blocks (also called windows) of equal size, but in our
case the block sizes are variable. There are two main reasons
to perform segmentation this way. First, when the user is not
interacting with the terminal, we do not have any interaction
sequences to use for authentication, so we ignore the sensor
data for durations when she is not interacting with the
terminal. Second, the user’s interactions themselves are of
variable duration so it makes sense to chunk accelerometer
data this way. For the durations when she is interacting,
one could segment sensor data into blocks of equal size
and infer an interaction for each block, but given that a
user’s interactions are of variable duration, it is likely that
one sensor data block would contain data for one or more
interactions, which would reduce the classifier performance.
Variable segmentation ensures that each sensor data block
contains data for just one interaction.
D. Features
This component receives sensor data in blocks, and it
computes a feature vector over each block. We do not
know the orientation of the user’s bracelet, so we ignore
the orientation (individual axis accelerations and angular
velocities) and just use the magnitude of acceleration and
angular velocity. For each acceleration data sample (t, x, y, z),
the magnitude m is given by
m =
√
x2 + y2 + z2
and for each gyroscope data sample (t, a, b, c), the magnitude
r is given by
r =
√
a2 + b2 + c2.
After computing these magnitudes, we now have for each
block a series of magnitudes (m0, r0), (m1, r1), . . ..
We compute the following 12 features over each series
of acceleration and angular velocity magnitudes in a seg-
mented interaction block: mean, median, variance, standard
deviation, median absolute deviation (MAD), inter-quartile
range (IQR), power, energy, peak-to-peak amplitude, auto-
correlation, kurtosis, and skew. We chose the first seven
features because others have used them successfully for
activity recognition [26] and for correlation among different
accelerometer signals [24]. We add the latter five features to
capture the patterns of the three interactions that we noticed.
During MKKM, there is a sudden spike in positive and
sometimes in negative direction, so we use peak-to-peak
amplitude. Because the placement of the peaks in a MKKM is
towards the start of the interactions, we use skew as a feature.
During typing, the peakedness is distinct, and so we included
kurtosis as one of our features. The wrist movement pattern
during a typing or scrolling interaction should be roughly
similar, unlike MKKM, so we use the auto-correlation feature
to capture that difference.
For each block of data, we compute a feature vector
F = (f0, . . . , f11), and send the sequence of feature vectors
F0, F1, . . . (each corresponding to one interaction block) to
the interaction classifier.
E. Interaction classifier
The classifier takes a feature vector F as input and outputs
an interaction ID, its inference that the sensor data associated
with that feature vector represents that interaction.
To train the classifier, we segment a subject’s wrist
sensor data based on her actual interaction timings, as
described above. We feed the classifier with feature vectors
corresponding to the actual interaction and provide the actual
interaction labels. Later, when evaluating our approach with
a given subject, we use a classifier that was trained with
other subjects’ data, because our intent is for the classifier
to be user agnostic.
The classifier receives a sequence of feature vectors
and it outputs its inference, a sequence of interaction IDs
(i0, i1, . . .). It then sends this sequence to the authenticator.
We explored two classifiers: Naive Bayes classifier and
Random Forest classifier. For our dataset, the Random Forest
classifier outperformed the Naive Bayes classifier; the results
reported in Section VI are with the Random Forest classifier.
F. Authenticator
The authenticator matches two sequences: the sequence of
actual interactions and the sequence of interactions inferred
by the classifier based on the user’s wrist movement. If the
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two sequences match, the authenticator outputs 1 indicating
that the current terminal and the bracelet user are the same.
On the other hand, if the two sequences do not match, it
outputs 0 indicating that the two users are different. If the
users are different, we need to deauthenticate the bracelet
user, who is logged in the terminal.
To match the two sequences, we use four parameters:
window size, overlap fraction, match threshold, and grace
period. The window size, w, is the number of interactions
the authenticator compares at a time. The overlap fraction,
f (0 ≤ f < 1), indicates how much we should overlap the
moving window, 0 being no overlap. For each window the
authenticator computes a matching score (between 0 and 1)
indicating how well the two sequences match in that window;
0 being no match at all, and 1 being a complete match. If
the matching score for a window is greater than the match
threshold, m, we output 1 for that window, indicating that
the terminal user and the bracelet users are the same for that
window. Otherwise, we output 0 for that window.
If we incorrectly output 0 for a window and deauthenticate
the user immediately, it would frustrate the user. To account
for such false negatives, we introduce the grace period
parameter, g. This parameter indicates how many consecutive
window scores of 0 are measured to deauthenticate the user.
For example, if g = 3 then we should get 0 for three
consecutive windows before we deauthenticate the user. We
reset the zero-count when we get a window with output
1. This parameter increases convenience but also increases
security risk; we keep its default value low.
VI. EVALUATION
As mentioned in Section III, we desire ZEBRA to be
continuous, passive, unobtrusive, user-agnostic, quick, and
accurate. We achieve the first four properties by design.
ZEBRA requires no explicit input from the user and as long
as the user is in (radio) proximity, i.e., the user’s bracelet
can send data to the terminal, ZEBRA continuously verifies
the presence of the user; thus, ZEBRA does continuous
authentication passively. The bracelet can potentially monitor
a user’s physical activity, which may be sensitive information
for some users. ZEBRA respects users’ privacy, and it does
not monitor the user’s movements when the user (and no one
else) is not using her logged-in terminal. While evaluating
ZEBRA for a user, we did not train the classifier using that
user’s data. Hence, ZEBRA is user-agnostic, i.e., independent
of the user’s behavior when she is using a terminal. We
evaluate accuracy and quickness through a user study and
present the results in this section.
A. User study
We recruited 20 subjects for our user study, using flyers
posted across our college campus and online. Table II shows
demographic data about the subjects. Subjects took about 30
to 40 mins to complete the user study; they received $10 as
Table II: Demographics of user study participants.













compensation. Our research protocol was approved by our
campus IRB.
The user study consisted of three experiments. The
first experiment was designed to capture the users’ hand
movements as they interact with a desktop in normal use.
Subjects were instructed to imagine that they were in a public
cafe and were asked to browse the web for 10min. They
were told that everything they typed would be logged and so
were asked not to enter any sensitive information. Further,
they were asked not to read any long articles or watch videos,
as it would not provide much data for our study.
We designed our second experiment to collect user
interaction data in a more controlled setting. Users were
asked to fill out a small web form, which required users to
type, scroll, drag the mouse, click, and move the mouse; they
were asked to fill this web form five times.
Our third experiment was designed to collect data to test
a malicious adversarial case. For this experiment, we asked
each subject to be a malicious adversary whose goal was to
mimic the victim user’s mouse-hand movements to the best
of their abilities. The victim user (one of the researchers)
filled out the same web form that the subjects used in
Experiment 2; thus, the subjects were already accustomed to
the task. We realize that a real adversary can be motivated
and skilled enough to mimic users very well, compared to
our subjects. So we decided to assist the subjects when they
were performing the role of a malicious adversary. To assist
them in mimicking the victim, we made sure they had a
good view of the screen and the victim’s hand movement,
we increased the cursor size, and the victim user gave verbal
clues before he began an action. For example, the victim
would say ‘typing’ before he began typing. He would say
‘2’ when he was going to fill the question number 2 in the
web form. The victim tried to use the same pace to fill out
the web form for all subjects, but reduced the pace for some
subjects when they were lagging too far behind. It should
be noted that this experiment was intended to be favorable
for the adversary.
Each subject performed, on average, about 192 Scrolling
interactions, 293 Typing interactions, and 146 MKKM
interactions in the three experiments. After these three
experiments, we asked each subject to walk for a few minutes
and to write on a paper, so we could collect data for walking
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and writing activities, because these are common activities
for a user that steps away from the terminal. We use this
data to evaluate how quickly ZEBRA can deauthenticate a
user when she does one of these tasks while another user
attempts to use her terminal.
B. Data collection
In our user study, we collected two types of data about
subjects’ interaction with the terminal: i) inputs received by
the OS through keyboard and mouse, captured by a script
we wrote; and ii) the subject’s hand movement, captured by
a sensor worn by the subject on her dominant wrist.
We used iMacs for our subject study. Subjects used an
iMac with an Apple keyboard and Apple mouse with a
scroll ball. We wrote a Python script that uses Apple’s
Cocoa APIs for OS X and captures all keyboard and
mouse input events generated by the operating system when
the subject provides input using those input devices. The
captured input events were KeyDown, KeyUp, MouseMove,
ScrollWheel, LeftMouseDown, LeftMouseUp, and
LeftMouseDragged, which are generated when the sub-
ject presses and releases a key, moves the mouse, uses the
scroll-wheel, presses and releases the left mouse button (left
click), and drags the mouse, respectively.1 For each keypress
event the OS reports the time when it is pressed/released,
the key value, whether the subject is holding the key down,
and whether the subject is repeatedly pressing the key. For
mouse-related events, the OS reports the time the event was
generated, absolute coordinates of the mouse pointer on
the screen, pointer displacement (in pixels) since the last
mouse event, and scroll length (i.e., how much the subject
scrolled the wheel). We log all this information, but in the
current implementation of ZEBRA, we use only the time
of event, event type, key value for keypress events, scroll
duration, absolute mouse pointer coordinates, and mouse
pointer displacement.
We used a Shimmer [27] to capture the subjects’ hand
movements, by asking each subject to wear a Shimmer device
on the wrist of the hand they normally use to operate a mouse.
The Shimmer contains an accelerometer sensor, a gyroscope
sensor, and a Bluetooth radio. Once connected to the terminal
over Bluetooth, the Shimmer streams its accelerometer and
gyroscope readings to the terminal at 500Hz, where they are
logged to a file. We calibrated all Shimmers’ accelerometers
and gyroscopes prior to their use.
C. Results
In this section we evaluate ZEBRA’s accuracy and how
quickly it deauthenticates users when an adversary starts
using their logged-in terminal.
1Although our implementation is for MacOS X, the same kinds of
information are available in Windows and Linux so our method should be
easily portable to other systems.
1) Accuracy: We use two metrics to evaluate the accuracy
of ZEBRA. The false-positive rate (FPR) is the fraction of
the testing data that is negative but misclassified as positive;
in ZEBRA the FPR is the fraction of all interactions where
an unauthorized user is authenticated as an authorized user.
Similarly, the false-negative rate (FNR) is the fraction of all
interactions where an authorized user is misclassified as an
unauthorized user.
A high FNR indicates that the system classifies an
authorized user incorrectly as an unauthorized user more
often. When this happens, the system takes protective action,
such as logging out the user or locking the terminal; both
actions will annoy the authorized user using the terminal. A
negative result indicates to the system that an unauthorized
individual is using the terminal and the system takes action,
such as logging out the user or locking the terminal. A false
negative is, as one might imagine, annoying to an authorized
user of the terminal. Thus, from the usability point of view
a low FNR is desirable. Figure 4 shows the average false-
negative rate across all subjects for different window sizes
and thresholds.
As described above, ZEBRA classifies the terminal user as
the bracelet user by comparing the actual interaction sequence
and the interaction sequence inferred by the classifier from
bracelet data. The comparison is performed over a given
window size. Thus, we compute an FNR as the fraction of
all windows where ZEBRA misclassified the authorized user
as an unauthorized user. Then each data point in the Figure 4
is the average of the FNR across all subjects for a given
window size and threshold value.
The threshold parameter indicates the fraction of interac-
tions in a window that should match for ZEBRA to consider
the user as the authorized user. Thus, the threshold value
indicates how strict ZEBRA is when correlating interactions,
and as expected the FNR is smaller for smaller threshold
values and it increases with threshold values. Window size is
the number of interactions matched at a time to authenticate
the user; a larger window size allows more interactions to
be matched, so the FNR drops as the window size increases.
ZEBRA performs best in terms of authenticating a user for
window sizes greater than 20; thus, the more interactions
a user provides while working on the terminal, the better
ZEBRA performs. In terms of threshold values ZEBRA
provides best FNR for 0.5 and 0.55, and reasonably well
for threshold value of 0.6. A low threshold value improves
usability but, as we show below, it reduces security, so we
need to choose the trade-off carefully.
For a given subject and adversary, the FPR is the fraction
of all windows where ZEBRA misclassified the adversary
as the subject (authorized user). We compute a FPR for
each subject as the average FPR across all adversaries; each
data point in the following FPR graphs is the average of
these FPR across all subjects. A high FPR indicates that we
falsely authenticate an unauthorized user as the logged-in
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Figure 4: Average false-negative rate vs. window size for
different thresholds (0.5, 0.55, 0.6, 0.65 and 0.7). ZEBRA
performs best in continuously authenticating users for window
sizes larger than 20.
user, allowing him to access the logged-in user’s account,
which is undesirable. Thus, a low FPR is good from a security
point of view. Window size is the number of interactions
that ZEBRA is allowed to consider to issue the decision
whether the current user is the same as the logged-in user.
Thus, ideally we want a low FPR for a small window size.
Figures 5 and 6 show the average false-positive rate when
the adversary is using the terminal and the logged-in user is
walking and writing, respectively, near the terminal. (Note the
different y-axis scales.) As expected, the FPR is smaller for
the higher thresholds. The FPR is low and drops quickly with
respect to window size, when the user is walking compared
to when she is writing because the wrist movements while
walking are very different to wrist movements when a user
is using the terminal, whereas the wrist movements during
writing are somewhat similar to terminal use. Figure 5 shows
that the FPR is below 0.02 for thresholds 0.6 and above,
even for short window sizes. The FPR in the user-writing
case drops below 0.03 for threshold 0.6 for windows of size
15 or greater. Thus, ZEBRA performs reasonably well even
if the user is performing an activity that is somewhat similar
to working on a terminal in terms of hand movements.
In our third experiment, we imagine a malicious adversary:
the user is logged-in on a terminal A but steps aside to
work on a nearby terminal B, and the adversary starts using
terminal A while trying to mimic the user’s hand movements
and similar interactions. If the adversary succeeds in mim-
icking the user’s hand movements while providing similar
interactions to terminal A, then ZEBRA will misclassify
the adversary as the user and the adversary can continue
using the terminal. In our experiment we asked the subjects
to be the malicious adversary and try to mimic a user (a
researcher). Both the subject and researcher performed the
same tasks (filling web forms), and the researcher’s screen
Figure 5: Average false-positive rate when the adversary is
accessing the terminal while the logged-in user is walking
nearby.
Figure 6: Average false-positive rate when the adversary is
accessing the terminal while the logged-in user is writing
nearby.
and hands were clearly visible to the subject. Figure 7 shows
the false-positive rate for this case. The FPR rate drops below
0.04 for windows of size 15, and threshold 0.6 and above.
Thus, even when the adversary and the user were performing
the same task on nearby terminals, and the adversary was
trying to mimic the user’s actions, ZEBRA performed well
in recognizing the adversary. Thus, ZEBRA should be able
to recognize a change in user even in an environment where
the previous user is working on a nearby terminal when a
new user walks to the unlocked terminal to use it.
In Table III we show the mean and standard-deviation
of FNR and FPR for all subjects for threshold of 0.6 and
four window sizes. The high variability in FNR is because
of Subject 1, whose wrist movement during keyboard and
mouse interaction were very different compared to the other
subjects. To keep ZEBRA user-agnostic, for each subject we
train the classifier using other subjects’ data, but if a subject’s
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Figure 7: Average false-positive rate when the adversary is
trying to access the user’s logged-in terminal by mimicking
the user who is using a nearby terminal.
interaction is very different than other subjects, the classifier
cannot accurately classify that subject’s interactions, which
affects ZEBRA’s accuracy in verifying that subject. This can
be resolved by training the classifier on a larger population
or training the classifier for these specific subjects. If we
exclude Subject 1, we get low variability and even better
FNR, as shown in the last column (FNR3) in Table III.
From the FPR and FNR results we found the parameters
that give a reasonable tradeoff between usability and security
with ZEBRA are window size of 21 and threshold of 0.6.
For window size of 21, ZEBRA verifies the user after every
21 interactions, which can take at most 21 s if the user is
providing inputs continuously, because each interaction is
at most 1 s long. However, in our experiment subjects took
about 6 s for 21 interactions. We use these optimal parameters
to evaluate quickness of ZEBRA in terms of the time ZEBRA
takes to recognize an unauthorized user.
Table III: Average FNR and FPR for different Window sizes
(W). Mean (and standard-deviation) of all subjects.
W FNR FPR1 FPR2 FNR3
5 0.164 (0.155) 0.016 (0.012) 0.061 (0.064) 0.140 (0.118)
13 0.041 (0.077) 0.007 (0.008) 0.061 (0.088) 0.026 (0.038)
21 0.037 (0.096) 0.001 (0.002) 0.031 (0.057) 0.017 (0.044)
29 0.035 (0.094) 0.001 (0.001) 0.017 (0.035) 0.015 (0.034)
1The adversary is using the terminal while the user is walking nearby.
2The adversary is using the terminal while the user is writing nearby.
3Mean (and standard-deviation) FNR for all subjects, excluding Subject 1.
2) Quickness: When the user changes (i.e., when the
current user is different than the logged-in user), we want
to identify the change immediately so we can prevent any
accidental or intentional misuse of the logged-in user’s
account. We define quickness as how ‘soon’ we can identify
a changed user, where ‘soon’ can be measured in time or
Figure 8: Fraction of authorized users that have access to
the terminal at time t, for optimal window size = 21 and
optimal threshold = 0.6.
windows, where a window represents a fixed number of
interactions. We use the ‘duration of attack success’ as a
metric to evaluate how quickly ZEBRA detects an adversary
and ‘duration of inappropriate lockout’ as a metric to evaluate
how often ZEBRA will lock out an authorized user because
it misclassified the user as an adversary. A smaller duration
of attack success is better as it gives a smaller attack window
for the adversary. On the other hand, it is desirable to have
extended periods of time without inappropriate lockouts in
order to improve usability.
Figure 8 shows the fraction of users that are recognized as
authorized users by ZEBRA at time t for a grace period (g)
of 1 and 2 windows. This figure shows the first instance in
time when ZEBRA misclassifies the user as an adversary and
takes action according to the system/user policy, which can be
to lock the terminal or log out the user. For instance, 95% of
users were still recognized as authorized users at 50 s, or said
another way, 5% of users were misclassified by ZEBRA by
time 50 s and may be required to re-authenticate themselves.
For grace period of 1 window, ZEBRA correctly recognized
85% of users throughout their session on the terminal. We
can improve this number by increasing the grace period. As
shown in the figure, for grace period of 2 windows, ZEBRA
recognizes 90% of users correctly throughout their use of
the terminal.
Figure 9 shows the fraction of adversaries that are
recognized as authorized users by ZEBRA at time t for
grace periods (g) of 1 and 2. This graph shows how
quickly ZEBRA can recognize an adversary and terminate
his access to the logged-in user’s account on the terminal.
As shown in the figure, for grace period of 1 window at
time t = 0, all adversaries have access to the terminal, but
within 5 s only 40% of adversaries have access – ZEBRA
identified on average 60% of adversaries as unauthorized
users within 5 s, and by t = 11 s, ZEBRA identified all
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Figure 9: Fraction of adversaries that have access to the
terminal at time t, for optimal window size = 21 and optimal
threshold = 0.6.
Figure 10: Fraction of adversaries that have access to the
terminal at the end of window w, for optimal window
size = 21 and optimal threshold = 0.6.
adversaries. A grace period of 2 windows improves usability
of ZEBRA, as shown in Figure 8, but it also increases the
attack duration for adversaries; nonetheless ZEBRA still
identified all adversaries within 50 s, much faster than typical
deauthentication timer methods.
Figure 10 represents the above graph but in terms of
windows instead of time, i.e., the fraction of the adversaries
that have access to the terminal at the end of window w,
where window size is 21 and threshold is 0.6. ZEBRA
identified all adversaries for grace periods of 1 and 2 by the
end of window 2 and 4 respectively. As we mentioned above,
the window size is determined by the number of interactions
(in this case 21), but interactions have variable duration;
to compare with the previous figure, for all adversaries a
duration of 2 windows was approximately 11 s.
VII. DISCUSSION
ZEBRA allows the adversary a small attack window before
it can identify him as an unauthorized user; the adversary can
misuse the logged-in user’s account within this window. This
window arises because ZEBRA identifies an unauthorized
user based on that user’s inputs, and it needs to collect
enough inputs to make a decision with high probability. This
attack window exists for all passive continuous authentication
schemes that leverage user inputs for authentication, including
keystroke biometrics and mouse biometrics. The effects of
this attack window could be reduced with some help from
the operating system (OS), if the OS buffers the user’s inputs
and actions, and has the ability to roll-back actions whenever
the inputs fail to authenticate the user. Nonetheless, without
ZEBRA, an adversary will have unrestricted access to the
terminal until he is caught, whereas with ZEBRA, he has
unrestricted access for only a short duration.
Sometimes there may be two users giving input to a
terminal, e.g., two users working together or a clinician
asking for IT help from a staff. If the two users are giving
input one at a time, then ZEBRA can be easily configured
to authenticate both users for that terminal. However, if the
users are giving input at the same time, e.g., one user is
typing and another is handling the mouse, ZEBRA currently
cannot verify either user; the user could temporarily disable
ZEBRA to allow access to both users.
A. Deauthentication response
At its heart, ZEBRA is a method for continuous authenti-
cation. In this paper, we motivate the need for continuous
authentication as a tool for automating deauthentication when
a new person tries to use a terminal that has another another
user logged-in. We emphasize, however, that the desired
response to such situations is a matter of policy. Once
ZEBRA decides that the terminal is now being used by
someone other than the logged-in user, the policy might
dictate that it lock the screen, or that it log-out the current user.
With small modifications, a graduated response is possible.
Recall that ZEBRA uses a threshold parameter m and a
grace-period parameter g in making its decision; instead of
outputting a binary decision, we could arrange for ZEBRA
to output a probability intended to indicate its confidence
that the user input is coming from the logged-in user. As
long as the probability remains high, the terminal operates
normally. When the probability drops, the screen may dim,
then darken, then lock, then log out – in each case offering the
user an opportunity to take an action (increasingly complex,
as the confidence gets lower) to restore confidence in her
authenticity. Such an approach can improve usability without
necessarily lowering security and is a topic for future work.
B. Application to initial authentication
We describe ZEBRA as a complement to initial authenti-
cation methods such as passwords, biometrics or hardware
718
tokens [28]. If the ZEBRA bracelet (token) can be strongly
tied to a specific user, such as through wrist biometrics [22],
it may be possible for ZEBRA itself (with major modifica-
tions) to be used for initial authentication. Since ZEBRA
authenticates users based on their inputs from the keyboard
and mouse, a ZEBRA-based initial authentication method
would involve tasks the user has to perform as part of the
initial authentication, and these tasks will generate enough
inputs for authentication. For example, as part of initial
authentication, the user could be asked to type a displayed
text, draw a circle, or scroll through a window. There exist
authentication methods that require the user to perform tasks
such as choosing a specific face among a group of faces. The
benefit of a ZEBRA-based method would be that it does not
place any mental burden on the user to remember any secret –
users do the tasks displayed on the terminal. The challenge
would be to design initial authentication that is short but
generates enough user inputs to achieve high confidence.
C. Automated attacks
We designed experiment 3 to explore the extent to which
an adversary may be able to defeat ZEBRA in an open
terminal, by observing the wearer of the bracelet that opened
the terminal. Our results suggest that it is hard to use an
open terminal while mimicking an individual.
In principle, it is possible to automate the observation and
monitor the victim using a video camera in combination
with the use of special hardware (keyboard and mouse) that
would release keystrokes and mouse input to the system at the
specific times when the camera observes motion that may be
consistent with a keyboard, MKKM, or scrolling interaction.
In this way, the attacker would only have to worry about
operating the terminal without having to consciously observe
the victim. Our view is that this kind of sophisticated attack
is stronger than what is necessary to beat passwords today.
A video camera can be used to obtain passwords [29]. Also,
if you can plug a custom set of keyboard and mouse into
a terminal, you can potentially plug a hardware key logger
(between the keyboard and the system) as well [30].
D. Extension
In this work, we focused on the deauthentication problem
for desktop computers because we were motivated by
associated problems faced by healthcare professionals in
hospitals. It would be natural to extend ZEBRA to mobile
devices, such as smartphones or tablet computers, and we
believe this is possible. However, we should note that mobile
devices present different challenges. First, users move their
wrists less when interacting with mobile devices (e.g., while
using mobile phones users often move only their fingers)
compared to when they interact with computer terminals.
Second, users could be on the move when interacting with
mobile devices, whereas they are not moving when using
a terminal. Third, the solution would have to be extremely
energy-efficient to be able to run continuously on mobile
devices. On the other hand, mobile devices do present some
opportunities. For example, most mobile devices have built-in
motion sensors, which could be leveraged for authentication.
ZEBRA could also be extended to other devices such as
TV-remotes, game controllers, medical devices – any device
where the user provides frequent inputs with her hand. For
these devices, however, the application may be more for
improving usability than security. For example, if the TV
remote could identify who is holding it, it could provide
personalized functionality, which could lead to a better user
experience; identifying who is using a particular medical
device or sensor could help provide a secure user-attestation
that is useful for healthcare professionals.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce Zero-Effort Bilateral Recurring
Authentication (ZEBRA), a novel mechanism that enables
continuous authentication of users who wear a simple bracelet
as an authentication token and without the need for any
specialized hardware at computer terminals. Such a mech-
anism provides the foundation for smart deauthentication
of computer terminal users in dense, dynamic work spaces.
Our approach is continuous, user-agnostic, and unobtrusive.
Our evaluation of ZEBRA – via a user study – shows that
ZEBRA can achieve high accuracy, correctly identifying 90%
of users and locking out adversaries in less than 50 seconds.
For stronger security, ZEBRA can lock out adversaries in less
than 11 seconds with a small penalty in usability. ZEBRA’s
continuous authentication complements nearly any initial
authentication (login) method and can drive a range of
automatic deauthentication policies.
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